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Abstract
Recent efforts to involve digital technologies and renewables in the
electricity grid have placed users at center stage in the legitimation of
energy transitions. This move has been paralleled by an emphasis on users
and energy practices in social studies of energy related to science and
technology studies. This article builds on an eighteen-month Living Lab
exploration of energy practices with smart electricity users in Bergen,
Norway. We make two interrelated arguments. First, energy production
and distribution in Norway and elsewhere is shifting toward greater
automation of tasks, possibly bypassing the “active user” concept. Energy
sector practices are evolving from simply extracting natural resources
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(Extraction 1.0) toward extraction of users’ behavioral data (Extraction
2.0), and privacy thus emerges as a key component in the stabilization of
energy systems. Second, we reflect on displacements of the roles and
possibilities of users (or “energy citizens”) thereby enabled, especially
their normative (political and regulatory) aspects. We propose that con-
ceptualization of energy practices be supported by the concept of regimes
of engagement from pragmatist sociology. Relatedly, we argue that market,
civic, ecological, and industrial regimes are being actively merged through
digital innovation and what we call the techno-epistemic network of smart
electricity.
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Smart grids mark a new development on the path towards greater consumer
empowerment, greater integration of renewable energy sources into the grid
and higher energy efficiency and make a considerable contribution to reduc-
ing greenhouse gas emissions and to job creation and technological
development.
European Commission (2012)
The ongoing smart energy transition that combines renewable energies with
the digitalization of the electricity grid has been hailed as a thorough trans-
formation of how energy is produced, distributed, and consumed (Wolsink
2012). Visions of this emerging smart grid have placed energy users and
consumers at center stage (e.g., Strengers 2013), serving as both benefici-
aries and interacting components in the remaking and stabilization of a
large-scale sociotechnical system (cf. Hughes 1983; see, e.g., Nyborg and
Røpke 2013; Skjølsvold et al. 2018). The promise is that more granular
consumption information, such as time of use and specific device, will drive
users’ energy practices and energy consumption in socially desirable direc-
tions. This shift is enabled through intimate entanglements with persona-
lized information and communication technologies (ICTs) such as smart
electricity meters (Hargreaves, Nye, and Burgess 2013) that provide regu-
lar, frequent readings of household energy patterns. Smart energy develop-
ments therefore open up contrasting prospects: more decentralization of
energy infrastructure and the centralization of data through interconnected
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data infrastructures; more user involvement and more automation and dele-
gation to third-party service providers. Whatever smart grid finally
emerges, the energy user thus occupies an important but controversial and
ambiguous role in the smart energy transition presently under negotiation.
Major research, innovation, and policy programs are now dedicated spe-
cifically to citizen-centric energy transitions and included in intensively net-
worked efforts across institutional, technological, and national boundaries.
Examples from Europe include the European Innovation Partnership on Smart
Cities and Communities (https://eu-smartcities.eu/clusters/3/description), the
trans-European innovation hub JPI Urban Europe, and the Smart Energy
European Technology Platform. Norway replicates these efforts through
national initiatives such as the Norwegian Smart Grid Centre and a number
of pilot and demonstration projects that make coordinated efforts to foster and
expedite smart energy developments and increase consumer flexibility.
The heavy policy emphasis on users has also impacted social sciences
and humanities (SSH) energy research oriented toward social and beha-
vioral aspects (Heiskanen and Matschoss 2016; Verbong, Beemsterboer,
and Sengers 2013), making SSH researchers cocreators of knowledge about
smart energy transitions (cf. Sovacool et al. 2020). Parts of this research are
quite instrumentally oriented and aim at energy efficiency (Lund et al.
2017) through behavioral economics (Bager and Mundeca 2017), computer
programming (Intille 2002), gamification, or the cocreative experimental
spaces of innovation and knowledge like demonstration projects (Bulkeley
and Castàn Broto 2013). Science and technology studies (STS) and social
studies of energy (Horta 2018; Skjølsvold, Ryghaug, and Berker 2015;
Sovacool et al. 2020; Strengers 2013) have pointed to the shortcomings
of such approaches and their intrinsic deficit models (Irwin and Wynne
1996; Oudshoorn and Pinch 2003; Wynne 1992, 1996) of energy users
(Nyborg and Røpke 2013; Ryghaug, Skjølsvold, and Heidenreich 2018;
Throndsen and Ryghaug 2015). Users are commonly expected to fall in
line and regarded as being in deficit when their everyday practices and
meanings differ from idealized, technology-centric prescriptions. This cri-
tique of deficit models includes the mechanisms and sites for broader
involvement where real-time experiments with energy practices play out,
such as Living Labs (Hyysalo, Jensen, and Oudshoorn 2016). We link this
analysis to the larger conceptual debate over social aspects of energy digi-
talization, highlighting that the current shift to smart electricity is also an
example of extractive creep, which enables a quantum leap in extracting
more and more information about and exerting greater control over users.
Ironically, this may render them rule-taking consumers (Sareen and
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Rommetveit 2019) by limiting their space for public engagement, although
(as we argue) this outcome is not inevitable.
In this article, we engage with this practice- and decision-making nexus,
describing aspects of ongoing Norwegian energy transformations through
reports from an urban living lab in Bergen that is part of a European project
(JPI Urban Europe).1 The Bergen Living Lab (BLL) involved forty-six
households over approximately eighteen months and took place alongside
Norway’s official smart meter rollout. The project involved installing
energy monitors at each participant’s home followed by iterative discus-
sions of participants’ smart energy practices, including their entanglements
with rights and the politics of energy.
Our article reflects critically on some of the leading approaches to the
user acceptability and public legitimacy of smart electricity. Although user
studies and studies of energy practices have yielded valuable results, we
argue for the need to further highlight normative (including political and
regulatory) dimensions. Drawing on pragmatic theories of regimes of
engagement (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006; Thévenot 2001, 2009), we
elicit the close entanglements between ways of engaging with material and
social worlds and ways of valuing and justifying developments that include
normative and political dimensions. We follow the distinction Thévenot
(2001) draws between levels of intervention and justification, stretching
from the familiar through planned strategic action to various modes of
public justifications; we focus on those belonging to the civic, industrial,
ecological, and market worlds. We highlight how networked innovation
processes and official policies symbolically and materially prefigure and
condition the critical repositories available to the publics engaged in energy
transitions and how citizens and users engage with energy transitions.
Insofar as the question is one of public engagement, we agree with the
arguments of Skjølsvold et al. (2018) and Sovacool et al. (2020) that per-
spectives should be developed beyond a focus on single sites and events to
incorporate multiple sites of intervention in energy transitions. To this end,
we use our concept of a techno-epistemic network (Ballo 2015;
Rommetveit, Van Dijk, and Gunnarsdóttir 2015, 2020) to refer to organized
and networked efforts by institutional actors and to forms of technical and
regulatory expertise. This can be seen as an extension of Boltanski and
Chiapello’s (2007) concept of networked regimes, which was developed
for managerial and corporate contexts but is here seen to intensify and
deepen by also incorporating and merging smart technologies with every-
day ecologies and political agendas.
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Subsection 1.1 describes the evolution of (smart) electricity in Norway
as the historically and publicly layered evolution of energy practices and
meanings: from Extraction 1.0 to Extraction 2.0. Following that, we situate
our research at the intersection of theoretical debates on energy use and
regimes of engagement and introduce the case study in these terms. Next, an
analytical account of the BLL case study focuses on (i) plug-and-play tech-
nicalities, (ii) energy practices, and (iii) political economy. Finally, the
concluding discussion reflects on the implications of Extraction 2.0 for
Norway’s smart grid and for social studies of users in energy transition,
along with the need for greater inclusion of normative dimensions.
From Extraction 1.0 to Extraction 2.0
Energy use is measured through infrastructure, and questions of energy
access and monitoring are inextricably linked with questions of control and
surveillance (Sareen, Thomson, et al. 2020). Historically, most energy sec-
tors are top-down bureaucracies, often state monopolies, with many having
undergone privatization and decentralization in recent decades. Control,
however, has changed hands largely on the supply side, between public and
private utilities and multiple levels of government. Only in rare cases of
citizen involvement have public empowerment and “taking back control”
come to the fore. These instances feature taut contestation and uneven
topographies of power—there is no citizen control without conflict with
other actors who cling to profitable positions (Cumbers and Becker 2018).
Digitalization can thus be read as the latest trend that affords possibilities of
shifts in control and must be understood as situated within the complex and
historically layered power field (Sareen, Saltelli, and Rommetveit 2020).
It is in this sense that we broach extraction—at first Extraction 1.0—in
Norway’s transitioning, rapidly digitalizing energy sector.
At the core of twentieth-century Norwegian societal and institutional
development was the extraction and development of Norway’s rich hydro-
electric resources (Angell and Brekke 2011), and their close connection
relations to local democracy in the early 1900s (Sejersted 1999). Until
World War II, hydroelectric developments were mainly undertaken at the
municipal level to cover local energy needs and those of ascendant indus-
tries located close to power plants (chemicals, metals, etc.), typically in
western Norway’s fjords. The postwar period ushered in state-led develop-
ments through the creation of a national grid and state companies, regula-
tory institutions, and oversight (Angell and Brekke 2011). Throughout the
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twentieth century, developments were successfully incorporated into
egulatory and political institutions and included numerous actors and con-
siderations, such as local interests and natural conservation. Renewables
entered the story alongside rising global concerns over biodiversity loss and
climate change (Angell and Brekke 2011).
Despite occasional escalated contestation between development and
environmental protection, a general consensus on the main goals under-
pinned Norway’s hydroelectric policies. In the 1980s and 1990s, however,
cracks appeared as Norway became an early promoter of the liberalization
of energy markets. The creation of a Nordic energy market was predicated
on the realization that “the great development projects are over” and on
overcapacity of energy production (Högselius and Kaijser 2007). This was
simultaneous with increasing integration into Nordic and European energy
markets (Silvast 2017). The contemporary landscape of Norwegian power
production and distribution consists of a large number of distribution ser-
vice operators (DSOs)2 that together constitute a regulated monopoly and
numerous small hydroelectric utilities with high degrees of public, primar-
ily municipal ownership. However, corporate shareholding, including for-
eign ownership, has expanded of late.
The drive for energy efficiency emerged during the late 1970s3 in the
form of technical and economic measures and simple changes in energy
behavior. It intensified with integration into the Nordic market and grid
digitalization. Smart electricity developments are being overlaid on earlier
stages of natural resource extraction and ensuing expansion into Nordic and
European markets. The national regulator states that, “new technology and
new market solutions can provide the basis for more active participation
and better insight into electricity consumption” (The Norwegian Water
Resources and Energy Directorate 2016). In this sense, the engineers have
returned but are now software and hardware developers who work closely
with market actors to create new digital energy markets.
Through the inclusion of novel technologies such as smart meters,
machine learning, and a centralized data hub (ElHub; https://elhub.no),
households and consumers themselves have become (re)sources for extrac-
tion of behavioral data and surveillance. This indicates the intensification of
a networked regime (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007) aimed at innovation
(Rommetveit, Van Dijk, and Gunnarsdóttir 2020) across industrial and
market regimes of engagement (cf. Ballo 2015; Boltanski and Thévenot
2006) that perform displacements of sites, meanings, and forms of authority
and expertise. This networked innovation now extends into the everyday
material worlds of people’s homes, through distributed, user-specific
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sensing infrastructure in the form of smart meters that enable Extraction 2.0.
As Zuboff (2018) argues, this materially enabled yet dematerialized form of
extraction combines expanding data infrastructures with the relentless spirit
of neoliberalism. We pursue its specific consequences in the electricity
sector, which in Norway is responsible for an extraordinary share of domes-
tic energy use. This is also likely to be increasingly the case elsewhere as
countries electrify and decarbonize more and more sectors, simultaneously
digitalizing and coupling them.
Ordering and Legitimating in Networked Innovation
Our account engages with those parts of the STS and social studies of
energy literature that acknowledge the performative role of deficit models
in smart energy transitions (cf. Irwin and Wynne 1996; Wynne 1992, 1996).
Although diverse, they point to asymmetries between innovators and
policymakers on the one hand and users and citizens on the other. These
asymmetries are reproduced in the major representations and imaginations
of users and of energy practices. We define certain key terms below.
User representations: The study of users and user representations has
a long tradition in STS. Early studies pointed to prefiguration and
scripting (Akrich 1992) by developers, seeing the technology-user
connection as relational. Subsequent scholarship included domestica-
tion (Lie and Sørensen 1996) and users’ creative adaptations
(Oudshoorn and Pinch 2003), including discrepancies between user
perspectives and developer scripts. The role of intermediaries in inno-
vation, especially prominent in ICT, was emphasized (Stewart and
Williams 2005). Hyysalo, Jensen, and Oudshoorn (2016) expound on
changing involvement strategies and enhanced user involvement in
innovation and product development, while Silvast et al. (2018)
describe how layered innovation and organization in energy infra-
structures deploy different user representations to coordinate across
sites, times, and scales.
Energy practices: A second line of scholarship applies practice theory
(Schatzki, Cetina, and von Savigny 2001) to energy practices (Shove
2003). A major aim here is to establish alternative accounts of “what
energy is for” (cf. Shove and Walker 2014), with practices critically
pitted against systems-based models from econometrics and beha-
viorism centered on individual choice (Horta 2018). This brings to
light the multifarious structures of energy practices, which often
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diverge from economic and behaviorist models (Shove 2003).
Practice theory can explain why users respond poorly to such models
and can trigger reflexive responses from energy producers and grid
operators for better education of users. Thus, Strengers (2013) points
to the persistence of Resource Man: “the gendered, technologically
minded, information-oriented and economically rational consumer of
the Smart Utopia” (p. 36). Strengers’s conception overlaps with
insights from user studies, specifically the relational character of the
concept of the user. This resembles how publics have been described
as codependent on sociotechnical imaginaries (Jasanoff and Kim
2015; Rommetveit and Wynne 2017).
Crucially, we note a research lacuna concerning citizens and users’ sense
of legitimacy or rightness as part of the process. We extend the above
perspectives by highlighting how users’ understandings, valuations, and
appeals to legitimacy intertwine with their concrete engagements with
smart energy technologies and policies. These developments have clear
real-world impacts on issues like equity, inclusion, and sustainability
(Sovacool et al. 2021), as was exemplified by the introduction of smart
meters in the Netherlands (Hoenkamp, Huitema, and de Moor van-Vugt
2011). In 2008, a legislative proposal to introduce smart meters in Dutch
homes was forwarded by standardization authorities and the Ministry of
Economic Affairs. Consumer and privacy advocates responded critically,
labeling the proposal a violation of personal privacy. Human rights lawyers
asserted that the initiative constituted a breach of Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights. Parliamentarians, lawyers, and the media
joined the mobilization, resulting in the withdrawal of the policy initiative.
The case triggered regulatory changes at a European level to introduce
privacy impact assessments and privacy by design (Van Dijk, Gellert, and
Rommetveit 2016) into the operation of smart electricity grids. Thus, Dutch
consumers earned the ability to opt out, enhanced data protection measures,
and better user interfaces (Hoenkamp, Huitema, and de Moor van-Vugt
2011); that is, Dutch smart energy practices were rerouted and remade
through civil society, assessments by human rights lawyers, the Dutch
parliament, and the European Commission.
These legal and institutional dimensions effected a displacement of
engagement and justification that, we claim, remains insufficiently
accounted for in existing research. We include the concept of regimes of
engagement (Thévenot 2009) to capture the diverse ways in which energy
users make sense of and deliberate about energy. Furthermore, we argue
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that such regimes are reconfigured, mediated, and prefigured by powerful
institutions, technologies, and innovation actors. We include here our con-
cept of techno-epistemic networks to account for certain key ways in which
such prefiguration plays out.
Following Boltanski and Thévenot (2006), a regime is grounded in
actors’ capacities for critique and justification and embedded in everyday
practice. This is an influential understanding of regimes in STS scholarship
(Latour 1998, 2004) and is distinct from other notions of sociotechnical
regimes that have gained prominence in energy transition research over the
past decade (e.g., Sadowski and Levenda 2020; Skjølsvold, Ryghaug, and
Berker 2015). These are compatible notions that differ in their analytical
focus. Central to the purpose of this article is how the regimes extend across
actors’ engagements with the world, where one mode of engagement is
nested within the other (Thevenot 2001). At one level, this ranges from
intimate and familiar ways of being and doing (dwelling, being at home)
through instrumentally oriented planning and strategy that encompass set-
ting goals and selecting the means to achieve them to fairly abstract regimes
of justification that enable equivalences to be made between different
things, rendering possible public legitimation and justification. According
to Boltanski and Thévenot (2006), there are six such regimes of public
justification: inspired, domestic, civic, opinion, market, and industrial.
A full account of the regimes is beyond the scope of this article (but see
Ballo and Rommetveit Forthcoming), and all six regimes could be charac-
terized as bearing on our case. Here, however, we emphasize the civic
regime, whose worth resides in arguments about the public and collective
good (including fundamental rights), the market regime, whose mode of
valuation is grounded in price, and the industrial regime, whose main order
of worth is based on productivity and efficiency. And, as we now outline,
there is the question of a further (networked) regime that was not included
in Boltanski and Thévenot’s original account.
If we consider the smart meter (and its derivative simulator relied upon
for this research, the submeter), we have a clear instantiation of a material
and technological artifact that intervenes across all the above levels of
human agency: it disrupts and reconfigures familiar relations and patterns
within a household, it triggers renewed planning efforts, and it is deeply
entangled in various regimes of justification or orders of worth. These are
furthermore embedded within market, legal, and industrial agendas, as the
Dutch experience clearly demonstrated. Conceptually, this is no different in
Norway, although specific developments play out differently. Our concept
of techno-epistemic network enters here as a reconfiguration of regimes of
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engagement through the material agency of the smart meter. This agency is
not a neutrally emerging technology but is shaped by powerful actors in the
spheres of governance, innovation, and engineering.
The main characteristic of this network is how it mobilizes sources of
knowledge and authority for the sake of overall societal purpose, in this case
the digitalization of the energy grid and consequent merger with energy
markets. In terms of participants’ responses, we trace the displacements
effected by such large-scale networking as a shifting space of possibility.
The broader significance of the techno-epistemic network is to enable this
shift from Extraction 1.0 to Extraction 2.0, to move energy practices from
analog to digital and data-driven. This shift displaces forms of expertise and
technological mediation and increasingly centers on automation and
third-party market creation aimed at extracting users’ behavioral data,
which is arguably a version of surveillance capitalism in the making
(Zuboff 2018). It will be interesting to further analyze the character of this
network as possibly extending Latour’s discovery of a seventh regime based
in ecology (Latour 1998) and the networked regime of business manage-
ment (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007). The techno-epistemic network dis-
plays characteristics from both but is identical to neither: it is justified as
environmental—but never comes close to Latour’s ecological bench-
marks—and extends Boltanski and Chiapello’s networked regime by build-
ing markets into material infrastructures and living ecologies.
Such theoretical qualification will have to wait, however. Here, our main
point is that this agency is already at work, stretching deep into living
ecologies and prefiguring and reconfiguring practices and pragmatic
regimes. In Exploring Pragmatic Regimes of Engagement in a Living Lab
section, we introduce our empirical case in terms of pragmatic regimes of
engagement.
Exploring Pragmatic Regimes of Engagement in a Living Lab
Urban living laboratories (“living labs”) are spaces for “real-life” experi-
mentation with climate change adaptation and mitigation, urban sustain-
ability, and resilience (Bulkeley and Castàn Broto 2013). Their open-ended
character is highlighted in the academic literature (Hyysalo and Hakkarai-
nen 2014), including coproduction with “issues of consumption, behavior
and lifestyles” (Voytenko et al. 2016, 46). STS scholars question whether
living labs extend beyond demonstration projects (Skjølsvold and Ryghaug
2015), whether they accelerate or slow down thinking and participation
(Farias 2017), and whether they open up or close off spaces for engagement
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(Stirling 2008). In constructing the BLL, we tried to account for all these
insights and for the normative aspects described above.
The goal of the BLL was not average representation but gaining insights
from people situated at the boundaries of the smart electricity
techno-epistemic network. We extended invitations to people with (expert
and lay) knowledge about smart electricity and environmental issues; to
some extent, then, these were early adopters (cf. Schick and Gad 2015).4
Participation came from most parts of the Bergen metropolitan area.5 We
also organized a steering group to guide recruitment and consultation that
included representatives from environmental organizations, Bergen Univer-
sity College, the Municipality of Bergen, the main energy and grid company
of western Norway (BKK), and small renewables enterprises.
The participatory stage lasted for eighteen months. Forty-six households
received energy monitors6 to install in their fuse boxes and connect to
BLL’s customized online platform. This generated household energy use
metrics, including visuals for smartphones and tablets. It was linked to an
analytics platform for comparison with other participants and simple gami-
fication elements. We conducted three rounds of focus groups, extending
open invitations to all participants in coordination with the project’s steer-
ing group. Each focus group had approximately ten participants, with the
second and third rounds featuring two sets of discussions for a total of five
sessions. Participants overlapped across the three rounds, with some repeti-
tion, allowing for both continuity and novelty in each session. Each focus
group followed a three-fold thematic structure reflected in the empirical
subsections: first, users’ experiences with the technology as it entered their
homes; second, users’ energy practices, and third, the broader political
landscape of smart electricity developments. In keeping with our pragmatist
approach, each meeting was recorded, transcribed, and coded in broad
accordance with the pragmatic regimes: familiarity, strategic planning, and
modes of justification (mainly industrial, civic, market, and ecological;
Boltanski and Thévenot 2006; Thévenot 2001; cf. Latour 2004). This order-
ing tracked participants’ imaginative and material explorations of smart
electricity as part of their everyday activities and energy practices.
Findings and Analysis
Getting Familiar with the Technology?
The home is the paradigm of a regime of familiarity, depending on an
“accustomed dependency with a neighborhood of things and people” and
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“a careful tuning with a nearby environment” (Thévenot 2001, 77). Such
tuning of things, practices, and attachments is characterized more by care
than by planning or purposeful action and is grounded in “dwelling”
(Heidegger 1978) and a “sense of home” (Ballo and Rommetveit forth-
coming). Introductions of new technologies into everyday life have been
described as disrupting this familiarity, triggering a process of creative
adaptation and domestication (Hargreaves, Nye, and Burgess 2010, 2013;
Lie and Sørensen 1996).
Such disruption is not merely negative; smart home technologies point
toward certain futures that several participants wanted to engage
pro-actively with, seeing disruption as part of normal development. One
stated: “this development of smart homes, I think it is the future in a way,
and from the point of view of personal experience I think it is very inter-
esting.” Like all Nordic countries, infrastructure and services in Norway
are generally high quality, and people take pride in being part of modern
societies where things keep improving (Lie and Sørensen 1996). Another
participant saw smart home developments as a foregone conclusion:
It is clear that the technology will just increase.( . . . ) If we are not paying
attention now, I feel like I will lose that information and the control of my
own life.( . . . ) If we are not paying attention to that technology, I feel like we
lose the autonomy to have an opinion
Thus, the home was not separate from innovation, and smart domestic
developments were imagined in continuity with other upgrades of home
appliances and living standards. The quote signifies an uncontrollable
developmental force and a race to keep up. It preempts possible futures
and the kinds of regimes of engagement available to citizens, a point we
return to in our closing reflections.
Smappee’s visualization of its submeter (see Figure 1) is an instantiation
of a “plug-and-play” imaginary. It creates popular smart grid imaginations
promoted by supply-side actors (Sovacool et al. 2021), according to which
keeping up should be fun, easy, and user-friendly. We saw this reflected
among our participants, especially in the early stages, and expressed in the
visualization elements of the app: “there’s something about this form of
visualization; it becomes almost game-like and so could do something for
motivation.” Participants saw this as potentially useful, both to transcend
ecological moralizing producing shame and bad consciousness (the ecolo-
gical regime) and to increase energy efficiency and improve cost-savings
(the economic regime).
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This was supposed to work through device-level granular visualization
of real-time energy usage but led to disappointments because real-world
deployment often proved difficult. The problems occurred in two stages: the
first was during energy monitor installation, which often required
project-financed assistance by an electrician. Participants experienced
problems with fuse boxes too far from the home Wi-Fi router and with
identifying cables to hook up the monitor’s sensors. This proved most
difficult with old fuse boxes, and one participant even rebuilt theirs. Sec-
ond, the device had to be “taught” how to recognize (through machine
learning) household appliances, which also proved difficult, as illustrated
by this exchange:
Participant: I had detected the underfloor heating cables in the hallway and
the heating cables in the bathroom. And the stove in the
kitchen. But ( . . . ) after a while I found out that it wasn’t quite
like that, it was ( . . . ) now it was off on the wall (switch), but
then it was on in the app.
Facilitator: Are they separate circuits? Could it be reacting to one and not
the other?
Participant: I don’t know.
Some managed better than others, but the sense of difficulty was wide-
spread and demotivating: “discovering the right things in the house has been
difficult.( . . . ) I lost inspiration to really try again.” The energy monitor thus
Figure 1. The plug-and-play imagery of the energy submeter. Source: smappee.com.
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led to estrangement with regard to both reducing household energy use and
the plug-and-play imaginaries of smart electricity. The energy monitor did
work, however, for some better than others, especially for solar prosumer
households. Despite these difficulties, participants continued referring to
the technology as part of future smart homes (presupposing improvement
and reconfiguration). Nevertheless, such estrangement almost by definition
triggered a search for a diagnosis or solution, indicating the close interrela-
tions of familiarity with a regime of planning or “normal functioning”
(Thévenot 2009). This became evident as we approached the topic of
energy practices.
Energy Practices: Automating the Comfort Zone?
Even when the monitor worked well, determining its impact on energy prac-
tices was not straightforward. This was partly due to many participants being
exceptionally interested in energy efficiency. As one stated, “actually getting
info about all the power units, in my case, there would not be any changes
( . . . ) but now I am perhaps above average proven on energy consumption in
the first place.” Among prosumer participants, energy-saving was detectable
from January 2018 to February 2019 (Table 1).
Yet, no similar trend was detectable among “ordinary” participants,
among whom two main arguments stood out. The first relates to the specific
cultural, climatic, and energy realities of the Norwegian setting and the
maintenance of high levels of comfort. The second relates to awareness
and economy of attention.
With regard to the first, Shove (2003) has shown that energy usage is
intimately connected to a sense of comfort and convenience. This is even
more true for Norway’s long, dark, and cold winters. Furthermore, energy in
Norway is relatively cheap due to abundant hydroelectric power. The argu-
ment that low energy prices lead to higher consumption goes back to
mid-1970s planning documents (Angell and Brekke 2011, 45). A related
image of consumers as “pampered” is part of Norway’s smart electricity
discourse (Ballo 2015). This idea appeared in our focus groups as “the
comfort zone”: “It is, as you say, that comfort zone. It is more important
to us Norwegians.” The comfort zone was invoked in relation to services
such as lighting (“we do not really have a culture of turning off the lights”)
and heating:7 “To me the comfort zone is really important. When I installed
the heating pump, I had a completely different temperature in the
mornings.” It was described as evolving and partly adjustable:




















































































































































































































































































































































































































It is actually possible to raise the comfort zone ( . . . ) it can go up and down
according to circumstance. We had a different comfort zone in the 1950s than
today. It increases as we take it to the next step, so then we set a new standard.
And the same with the next development.
In relation to everyday energy practices, the comfort zone is primarily a
limit. Speaking of energy-saving measures for Norwegians, an argument
that raised no objections among those in the focus group stated how “we are
very clever until we reach the comfort zone. If the comfort zone is threat-
ened, that’s the end of it.”
Levels of attention, awareness, and interest were unevenly distributed.
One person within a household might retain interest, but this person could
be overruled or simply ignored by others (“when you are the only one out of
four who thinks that way, you are overruled quite quickly”) or even become
an in-house energy tyrant: “You have controlling parents around who will
lock their kids up for a week because they showered for too long.” This
supports empirical findings from practice studies that show how household
dynamics limit the potential for various deficit models, as smart energy
technologies encounter preexisting fabrics of domestic practices, values,
and meanings (Hargreaves, Nye, and Burgess 2010; Shove and Walker
2014; Strengers 2013).
Participants described a drop in interest in monitoring energy after some
weeks, a finding confirmed by previous user studies (e.g., Naus et al. 2015).
In a follow-up questionnaire, ten of the twelve replied that their energy
monitoring app usage was “initially active, then diminishing”; only two
said it remained “relatively constant over time” (see Sareen and Rommet-
veit 2019 for further details). Correlated with the technical difficulties
above, this indicates that the “energy-aware user” enacting active forms
of energy citizenship (Devine-Wright 2007; Ryghaug, Skjølsvold, and
Heidenreich 2018) largely failed to materialize in our BLL.
One participant explained how
It’s a bit like doing a back-up. If you have to do it yourself ( . . . ) you will
remember every day for the first week, then you do it only once a week the
first three weeks, and suddenly six weeks have passed, and your computer
breaks down.
This led directly to an argument that energy monitoring should be auto-
mated: “For this to work for ordinary people, on a large scale, it has to be
automated.( . . . ) It has to be so easy that you can go about your daily life
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without this causing stress.” To some extent, therefore, planning was
deployed toward measures that would simplify or even avoid the abundance
of energy information as a way of increasing awareness while maintaining
the comfort zone. These automation arguments entail a move from civic to
industrial world justifications and a shifting of responsibility. On the users’
side, we interpret this planning move as induced partly by the practical
difficulties of being an “active user” and partly by prior knowledge of smart
technologies as exhibiting a progressive tendency toward automation that is
observable in the media and intrinsic in the technology.
Politics: Engaging and Blocking the Extracted Public?
A near consensus emerged that automation is simply bound to occur. At the
level of collective imagination, certain futures seemed determined, whereas
others had been preempted. Automated measurements of electricity con-
sumption are now formally enabled through official smart meters in all
Nordic countries (Silvast et al. 2018). Shortly after our focus groups were
carried out, the national central hub ElHub came online in 2019, marking
the culmination of smart grid enablement in Norway. Its main functions are
to deliver continuous readings and calculations of all production and con-
sumption in Norway and to facilitate coordination among grid operators and
energy providers, including similar data hubs in Sweden, Denmark, and
Finland (Silvast 2017). It enables an “integrated market” all the way down
to the retail level, including access for what are known as third parties,
conditional on users’ acceptance. Elhub provides an overview of approxi-
mately 664 validated “actors” as of February 2020 who can access this
granular, dynamic data: energy companies, grid operators, end users, and
third parties whose typical task is to deliver energy advice and facilitate
energy-saving measures (ElHub 2019).8
One such service provider was the Swedish company Tibber, which was
mentioned several times during focus group discussions. Its Pulse monitor
works similarly to the Smappee energy monitor but without the need for
sensors connected to electricity cables; it is plugged directly into the home
area network or HAN port of the new smart meter fuse boxes and thus (per
our participants) operates more reliably. Here, “the energy market” has
morphed into an entirely digital format, as Tibber actually replaces one’s
power supplier with an app that acts autonomously to buy, control, and save
energy.9 It effects a merger between digital technologies and markets (cf.
Silvast 2017), centering on demand response, energy efficiency, and
energy-saving services through the layering of physical and virtual
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infrastructure. The Norwegian techno-epistemic network, then, merges the
industrial and market regimes of engagement, with energy engagement
enabled and configured within the algorithmic space of a smartphone app.
Since the smart meter is also a central enabling technology for the Internet
of Things, this market expands as more and more smart household appli-
ances come online. One participant related that “they have loads of integra-
tion to all kinds of things ( . . . ) for instance, my heater can be hooked right
into Tibber.” Because smart electricity enables two-way energy transac-
tions and communications, this is the materialization of energy markets as
surveillance capitalism (Zuboff 2018), thriving on the commodification and
marketization of behavioral and household data (cf. Sareen, Saltelli, and
Rommetveit 2020).
The above contradicts the imaginary of an actively engaged user; rather,
participants’ expectations locked in nicely with the requisites of surveil-
lance capitalism. But this does not mean that participants agreed with this
reality; as seen above, it also signifies resignation in the face of forces that
are difficult if not impossible to influence: “I’m absolutely certain that this
is coming, eventually, at least for washing machines and all such.( . . . )
Whether you want it to or not. So I am most concerned about being able
to say no to this, to keep control of the data.” Matters of energy management
that cannot realistically be dealt with at the household level were rerouted to
different sites and scales (Sareen and Rommetveit 2019). The ability to
decline participation shifted the level of argumentation toward a civic
regime that, as in the Netherlands, would enable and protect such engage-
ment. In the remainder of this section, we reflect on issues of trust, privacy,
and the politics of energy as they pertain to a civic regime of engagement.
This includes how the articulation of these issues is blocked by a lack of
institutional mechanisms for engagement, effectively creating an obstacle
model of public issues (Rommetveit and Wynne 2017).
As in other countries, resistance has emerged in Norway to the rollout of
smart meters. The national movement Stopp smartmålerne10 (“stop smart
meters”) claims privacy, health, and energy sovereignty as its main issues.
Unlike the Dutch case, the Norwegian movement has thus far failed to
effect any political or regulatory changes. People refusing to let the grid
operator into their house to install the smart meter risk being prosecuted
with fines, jail (for up to a year), or disconnection from the grid. Privacy
concerns are not recognized as reasons for opting out, and the only legally
valid way out is to obtain a declaration about radiation sensitivity from
one’s general practitioner. This has led to pushback from those doctors,
who do not want the problem dumped on them. They argue that the question
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of radiation sensitivity cannot be dealt with in scientifically adequate ways
and that the Norwegian health authorities themselves have concluded that
no risk from radiation exists. Thus, the main available civic justification for
opting out runs through a rather idiosyncratic medicalization of the problem
rather than through the fundamental rights that are so prized in Norway and
its EU neighbors.
Concomitantly, we found few indications that participants trust the grid
operators or energy companies responsible for the rollout of smart meters;
rather, since the grid is a regulated monopoly that offers users few possi-
bilities for opting out, users have limited options and must be seen as acting
under conditions of what Wynne (1992) has called virtual, or “as-if,” trust.
One quipped, “I don’t trust the system, it’s like a black-box.( . . . ) We
produce electricity and then we buy it back. It’s a free market principle and
real capitalism—it’s not the environment driving this. So I feel like there’s
two different lines of arguments there.” In spite of this criticism, several
participants argued that they would trust market actors more, since at least
then they would have the ability to choose. This distrust, combined with the
expression of faith in the free-market promise of choice, has implications
for future digitalization and energy policies and the extent to which they
lean on market regimes. The above quote was explicitly linked with the
possibility of greater exchanges of (clean) energy with other European
countries. Several participants argued that such exchanges are necessary
since the climate system is global and there is no use in Norwegians alone
enjoying clean electricity: “We have just one world and one climate. It
doesn’t help if we go all green, if coal power is fired up right next door.”
Others argued for Norway to retain energy sovereignty and stop its
ever-closer integration with Europe through transnational electricity cables
and markets. These two positions signify a deep rupture in Norwegian
political culture between those who favor deeper integration with the EU
and those who adamantly oppose it. This was recently exacerbated by the
Norwegian Parliament’s adoption of the EU’s third energy package and the
decision to join ACER, the European Union Agency for the Cooperation of
Energy Regulators.
Although this entrenched controversy cannot be addressed here, the
distrust cuts across positions. It targets energy companies, grid operators,
and national and European authorities and pertains to the lack of privacy
and transparency about everything from pricing to personal data to the
sources of energy. The image of energy sources and markets as black boxes
was persistent throughout the BLL. Whereas strong popular sentiments
would argue for stronger civic regimes of engagement, in reality, a civic
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regime such as the legality of energy markets is strongly predicated upon
the features of a network monopoly. Beyond the bare minimum, or osten-
sibly a notch higher in the Dutch case, legality in the Norwegian case never
extends to an ability to opt out that is based on fundamental rights.
From Energy Use to Stabilized Regimes
of Engagement
In this article, we began by noting the strong focus on users and user
engagement in legitimating the transition to smart energy. This emphasis
is to a large extent replicated and sometimes contested in the flourishing
scholarly literature on users, energy practices, cocreation, and living labs.
Within the STS-relevant parts of this literature, we noted a dual tendency:
first, accounts of users and energy practices have tended toward greater
complexity, taking into account the increasingly composite, dispersed, and
networked innovation environments through which smart energy is rea-
lized. Second, we have argued that normative and regulatory elements are
not sufficiently considered or accommodated. Extending the import of
arguments within user and practice studies, it becomes necessary to attend
to the kinds of argumentative registers available to citizens, users, and
publics in engaging with main technological and policy agendas.
Perhaps, the greatest challenge for a focus on users is the inherent shift
toward automation and delegation to third parties of the main tasks that
relate to energy monitoring and efficiency. This tendency was, as we saw,
confirmed and to some extent supported by our participants, most of whom
were not willing to do all the technical work and constant monitoring
required for more and better energy sustainability. This necessitates a deem-
phasis on the role of users and opens the field of play to new actors, such as
Internet of Things deployers, innovative energy utilities, and suppliers that
build out new offerings such as smart charging applications and smartphone
applications for cosharing of revenues derived from energy flexibility. The
latter possibility indicates the prospective emergence of contestation and
further reconfiguration of “passive consumer” roles, something for which
our participants, especially the more tech-savvy among them, clearly
expressed an appetite. On a related note, system innovations like ElHub
enable not only intermediaries such as Tibber but also the emergence of a
whole new ecosystem of ICTs, with interactive energy use and data extrac-
tion built on their back.
If the sites of intervention and regulation are displaced (Sareen and
Rommetveit 2019) as denoted by the shift from Extraction 1.0 to Extraction
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2.0, so must the efforts to keep up with the politics and the citizens’ rights
perspectives. This is also where our notion of a networked regime of
engagement comes to the fore, since it accommodates a shift of perspective
toward more rights-based and public-argumentative interactions aimed at
the institutional anchoring of smart energy transitions. While our partici-
pants confirmed and (to some extent) encouraged the shift toward automa-
tion, this did not imply a lack of concern for the normative implications of
this displacement. Indeed, this concern was demonstrated by reference to
distrust in institutions, privacy, and the politics of energy. Interest in these
topics was just as high as in issues relating to energy practices and navigat-
ing technical problems; indeed, it was in many cases more intense.
However, this interest is hampered by a lack of regimes of engagement;
that is, institutions and networks through which that interest could be chan-
neled. Such critical engagement has been preempted by an incipient
techno-epistemic network: regulatory interventions that have been ongoing
since the 1990s have more recently been bolstered by meanings revealed
through the technologies themselves. Most participants saw smart electric-
ity and automation as fated, as bound to occur. As we have seen, this
apparent inevitability is inscribed into all the regimes described here, from
familiarity to overall justification. The existing civic regime is restricted to
propping up the monopoly of certain actors and favoring the increased
mergers of technology and markets. Here, the contrast with the Dutch case
is illustrative; it was the coordinated effort to intervene in the regulatory and
standard-setting process at an early stage that ensured a somewhat expanded
regime of engagement. This kind of public feedback has not been realized in
the Norwegian case. Users, whose data are now among the resources being
extracted, have been too slow, dispersed, and nonstrategic to establish the
necessary channels for engagement. The rapidly digitalizing energy sector
displays a preset orientation anchored in the interests of well-networked
industrial actors.
What the stabilization of Extraction 2.0 regimes of engagement does not
accomplish—in stark contrast with the opening quote that epitomizes the
hyped-up promise of digitalization for European energy transitions—is
empowering citizens as users and decision-makers who can autonomously
and cooperatively redesign energy futures. Based on the evidence so far, the
outcomes of digitalization (and its implications for user engagement)
remain predicated on how the dominant players drive sectoral trajectories
in line with their objectives, oriented toward a blend of commercial and
national interests, with market and industry modes of justification in the
driver’s seat. Norway’s digitalized electric grid is emerging in the manner
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of a sophisticated techno-epistemic network that is perpetuating
business-as-usual outcomes within closely connected data infrastructures.
A central element of this assemblage is the strategic deployment of user
representations that constrains dispersed user agency and wider publics
even as it strengthens the position of dominant sectoral actors.
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Notes
1. The project ran parallel pilots in Bergen, Amsterdam, and Brussels, focusing on
community aspects of energy consumption and efficiency (https://jpi-urbaneuro
pe.eu/project/parent/).
2. There are approximately 124 distribution service operators and about the same
number of utility companies, which is extraordinary for a country of five mil-
lion. However, many are merging, so the overall numbers are declining.
3. Traditionally under the heading of ENØK (short for energy efficiency), over-
seen by the national public agency ENOVA, and responsible for a host of smart
metering pilots.
4. A few participants self-reported as “prosumers,” people who both produce and
consume energy and sometimes sell power to energy markets on the electric
grid.
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5. Bergen is the capital of western Norway and Norway’s second largest city. The
Bergen metropolitan (in which the project was carried out) area comprises
approximately 420,000 inhabitants.
6. Participants received a submeter energy monitor called a “Smappee” (www.
smappee.com) with an accompanying app for energy management. The app
showed visualizations of household electricity consumption data disaggregated
into individual devices and overtime.
7. In Norway, electricity is the most important source of heating, accounting for
approximately 83 percent of energy used for heating. About 78 percent of
electricity consumed in Norway is used for heating.
8. This list is therefore strongly indicative of the Norwegian smart electricity
techno-epistemic network.
9. According to the Tibber App at AppleStore (https://apps.apple.com/no/app/
tibber-smarter-power/id1127805969).
10. https://stoppsmartmaalerne.no/. This is only one among several initiatives.
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